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Pro-competitive  reforms  have  been  implemented  in  many  Western  healthcare  systems,
of which  the  Netherlands  is a prominent  example.  While  the  pro-competitive  reforms
in  the Dutch  specialized  care  sector  have  drawn  considerable  academic  attention,  men-
tal health  care  is  often  excluded.  However,  in line  with  other  segments  of specialized
care,  pro-competitive  legislation  has  formed  the core of  mental  health  care  reforms,  albeit
with several  notable  differences.  Ever  since  mental  health  services  were  included  in the
Health  Insurance  Act  in 2008,  the Dutch  mental  healthcare  sector  has  been  in  an ongo-
ing  state  of  reform.  Numerous  major  and  minor  adaptations  have  continuously  altered
the  services  covered  by the  basic  insurance  package,  the  actors  responsible  for providing
and contracting  care,  and  deﬁnitions  and  measurements  of  quality.  Most  notably,  insurers
and municipalities,  which  are  responsible  for selectively  contracting  those  providers  thatetherlands offer high  value-for-money,  seem  insensitive  to quality  aspects.  The  question  whether  the
Dutch mental  health  sector  has  inherited  the  best  or  the  worst  of  a competitive  and  non-
competitive  system  lingers  and  international  policy  makers  contemplating  reforming  their
mental  health  sector  should  take  note.
©  2016  The  Authors.  Published  by  Elsevier  Ireland  Ltd. This  is  an  open  access  article  under
the  CC  BY-NC-ND  license  (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).. The purpose of pro-competitive reforms
Reforms introducing managed competition in
ealthcare markets have gained a prominent role on
olicymakers’ agendas over the past decades [1,2]. Albeit
n different forms, pro-competitive legislation has been
 Open Access for this article is made possible by a collaboration
etween Health Policy and The European Observatory on Health Systems
nd Policies.
∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +31 43 388 1731.
E-mail addresses: d.westra@maastrichtuniversity.nl
D. Westra), g.wilbers@mondriaan.eu (G. Wilbers),
ederica.angeli@maastrichtuniversity.nl (F. Angeli).
1 Tel.: +31 61296011.
2 Tel.: +31 43 388 2962.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.healthpol.2016.02.014
168-8510/© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ireland Ltd. This is an open ac
icenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).introduced in several countries, of which the United States
and the Netherlands are prominent examples [3,4]. The
essential assumption underlying these reforms is that
introducing (managed) competition in healthcare markets
will lead to maximum value for money for consumers [4].
However, the speciﬁc nature of demand, supply condi-
tions, uncertainties, and pricing strategies in health care
[5] make the link between introducing competition and
the envisaged beneﬁts difﬁcult to predict. While the ulti-
mate goal of the reforms is to enable the system to deliver
good–or even better–care, at lower costs, outcomes of
pro-competitive healthcare reforms are far from straight-
forward. In fact, a wide and rich scholarly debate has
addressed the implications of competition in healthcare
[6,7]. Yet, a meso perspective that focuses on the strategic
cess article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/
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behavior – and reaction – of organizations is lacking.
Moreover, when it comes to competition in healthcare,
several studies have considered the Netherlands but few
have focused on the mental health sector. This paper
discusses the ongoing pro-competitive reforms in Dutch
curative mental health care. It considers the perspective
of purchasers (i.e. insurers and municipalities) and mental
healthcare providers in the sector.
2. Reforming mental health: an ongoing process
The introduction of the Health Insurance Act (HIA)
in 2006 is generally considered synonymous to pro-
competitive reforms in Dutch healthcare [3]. However,
pro-competitive reforms have been implemented as a bun-
dle of subsequent incremental measures rather than with a
‘big bang’ approach [8]. Hence, the introduction of the HIA
in 2006 marks the beginning of an era in which Dutch pol-
icy makers have attempted to build competitive elements
into their healthcare system. The mandatory basic insur-
ance package, introduced by the HIA [3], initially did not
include coverage for mental health services. In 2008, two
years after the introduction of the HIA, all curative mental
health services, focused on curing patients within one year,
were shifted from the Exceptional Medical Expenses Act
(EMEA) to the HIA [9]. Long-term mental health services
(i.e. requiring treatment longer than 1 year) and foren-
sic mental health services remained covered by the EMEA
[10]. As a result, insurance companies became responsi-
ble for contracting curative mental health services. Primary
care providers (e.g. psychologists) were contracted on a
per-consultation basis, for which price was freely nego-
tiable. Contracting of secondary providers (e.g. mental
health hospitals) revolved around newly introduced DRG-
like products called Diagnosis Treatment Combinations
(DTCs). Contrary to DTCs in other segments of specialized
care, the national health authority set maximum prices for
all DTCs in mental health care [9], although providers and
insurers were free to negotiate for a price below the maxi-
mum  amount [11].
Since 2008, Dutch curative mental health has been in
a near-ongoing state of reform. Coverage for a number of
services was removed from the basic insurance package
in 2010, 2012, and 2013. Co-payments were introduced in
2012 and (partially) removed in 2013 and 2014. National
budget reductions were enacted in 2010 and 2015, reduc-
ing the maximum budget available for mental health care.
The DTC structure for inpatient services was revised in
2012. The mandatory deductible (‘eigen risico’), which
requires patients to pay a speciﬁc amount of treatment
costs out-of-pocket, was increased annually. Budgeting of
secondary mental healthcare providers was discontinued
in 2014, requiring them to adopt the DTC structure, and
several quality enhancing initiatives were undertaken by
stakeholders.
In 2014, mental health was divided into two segments in
order to create a more effective and efﬁcient sector capable
of delivering services close to the patients’ home, with-
out co-payments, [11,12]. Patients with mild mental health
problems were to be treated by primary care providers
(i.e. GPs, assisted by mental health physician assistants). 120 (2016) 345–349
Consequently, the number of consultations conducted by
these physician assistants more than doubled in 2014
[13]. Patients with moderate mental health conditions are
referred to the ‘generalist basic mental health’ segment
by their primary care provider, while patients with severe
mental health conditions are referred to ‘specialized men-
tal health’ [11,12]. The maximum treatment price in both
of these segments is deﬁned by the health authority.
In 2015, curative mental health was  redeﬁned to include
treatment of patients up to three years, shifting coverage
of all treatments lasting between one and three years from
the EMEA to the HIA. At the same time child and youth
mental health services, with the exception of pharmaceut-
icals and services offered by primary care providers, were
shifted from the HIA to the Youth Act (YA). Consequently,
municipalities were responsible for both social care and
(purchasing of) mental health care for children under the
age of 18, which constitutes almost a quarter of the patient
population in Dutch mental health [14,15]. See Table 1 for
an overview of the reforms in Dutch mental health care
since 2008.
3. Battling for bargaining power
In 2013 approximately 1.3 million people received men-
tal health care services which were covered by the basic
insurance package. The 4.3 billion Euro spent on those
services constitute 10% of the total spending in the basic
package [14,16]. Secondary (i.e. specialized) mental health
services account for roughly 92% of the spending [17], even
though less than 10% of the patients are admitted to a sec-
ondary mental health provider for at least 1 night [15,18]. In
2012, an estimated 6000 primary mental health providers
(e.g. psychologists), 265 secondary mental healthcare orga-
nizations, and 3000 independent secondary practitioners
offered mental health services [11]. However, 37 providers
are responsible for more than half of the (curative and long-
term) mental health expenditures in the Netherlands [11].
The prices of these providers have increased between 2008
and 2011 [11], leading some researchers to conclude that
providers are able to exercise bargaining power [19].
Between 2008 and 2014, nine insurance companies
contracted providers for curative mental health services.
Four insurers decided to jointly contract mental health
providers, through a collective agreement [20]. Of  the
remaining ﬁve insurers, the four largest possess a com-
bined 89% market share [21]. Between 2008 and 2012 the
Herﬁndahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), a measure which indi-
cates the degree of competition in a market (i.e. a value
above 2.5 is typically seen as an indicator of a highly con-
centrated market [6].), of the health insurer market has
consistently exceeded 2.1 at national level and exceeded
3.0 in eight of the country’s twelve provinces in 2012 [22].
Until 2014 it was  furthermore possible for one insurance
company (i.e. the largest in a speciﬁc region) to negoti-
ate on behalf of all other insurance companies [11]. The
fact that prices of independent secondary providers have
decreased between 2008 and 2011 leads other researchers
to conclude that insurance companies are able to exercise
bargaining power [11].
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Table 1
Reforms in Dutch mental health care between 2008 and 2015. Based on [9–11,20,21,25,29–31].
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Sector Financing of
curative mental
health services
shifted from
Exceptional
Medical Expenses
Act (EMEA) to
Health Insurance
Act (HIA)
Governmental
approval for
construction
activities no longer
required
Restructuring of
primary and
secondary curative
mental health into
‘General basic
mental health’ and
‘Specialized mental
health’
Financing of mental
health for children
below the age of 18,
ambulatory coaching,
day care, and protected
living shifted from HIA
to Youth Act and Social
Support Act
Financing of mental
health services lasting
between 1 and 3 years
shifted from EMEA to
HIA
Purchasing Introduction of
Diagnosis
Treatment
Combinations
(DTCs) in curative
secondary mental
health
Budget reduction
of D 119 million
imposed
Advanced
payments for
non-budgeted
providers
introduced
New product structure for
inpatient mental health
services
Maximum price of some
DTCs reduced and no-show
no longer billable
Providers and insurers
allowed to introduce new
services in primary mental
health
Introduction of
macro level cost
containment tool
Budgeting
removed (i.e. all
ﬁnancing per DTC)
Prices in mental
health re-evaluated
by healthcare
authority.
Maximum prices
for inpatient care
increased by 10%.
Representation
purchasing
removed
DTC structure for
mental health for
children no longer
obliged but upheld by
most municipalities
Municipalities are
required to reduce
budget of mental
health services for
children under the age
of 18 but are free to
allocate resources
themselves
Coverage ‘Psychoanalysis’
removed from the
basic package
‘Adjustment disorder’
removed from basic
package
Number of consultations in
primary mental health
covered by the basic
package reduced
‘Other conditions
which are a reason
for concern’
removed from the
basic package
Co-
Payments
Co-payments in primary
mental health increased
Co-payments for inpatient
mental health introduced
Co-payments in
secondary mental
health removed
All co-payments in
mental health
removed
Deductible Mandatory
voluntary
deductible
introduced
Mandatory
deductible
increased
Mandatory
deductible
increased
Mandatory
deductible
increased
Mandatory deductible
increased
Mandatory
deductible
increased
Mandatory
deductible
increased
Mandatory deductible
increased
Quality  of
care
‘Knowledge Center
Health’ created by
health insurers
Project ROM
started by ‘Mental
Health
Netherlands’
CQ-index
outpatient mental
health services
obligatory
Providers expected
to report ROM
measures for 20%
of all DTC
Number of
performance
indicators reduced.
Privacy regulation for DTC
billing process introduced
Performance indicators
redeﬁned and ROM
indicators obliged method
to measure treatment
effectiveness
Providers expected
to submit ROM-
measurements for
50% of all DTCS
Additional professions
are considered
appropriate to be ‘in
the lead’ of a treatment
th Policy348 D. Westra et al. / Heal
As of 2015, child and youth mental health services are
purchased by the 393 Dutch municipalities [23], presenting
providers with more potential purchasers of their services.
However, municipalities lack experience in purchasing
(mental) health services, which is likely to increase transac-
tion costs, in terms of longer and more difﬁcult negotiations
due to information asymmetries. Furthermore, municipal-
ities purchase child and youth mental health services on
behalf of all their inhabitants. Patients who want to be
treated by a provider which is not contracted by the munic-
ipality in which they live thus need to seek care from
another provider or move to another municipality, creat-
ing a de facto monopoly for municipalities as purchasers
of child and youth mental health services. In transferring
services to the YA, municipalities have also been assigned
the task to reduce health spending, which provides an
incentive for them to exercise their monopsony power. Ini-
tial reports indicate that two thirds of all mental health
providers expect waiting lists to occur due to the low
amount of services contracted by municipalities [24].
4. The quality question
Being prudent purchasers of mental health services
implies purchasing care against the lowest possible costs
and of the highest possible quality. Deﬁning and measuring
quality of care is thus essential. The ﬁrst set of performance
indicators for mental health organizations was introduced
in 2006 and it measured three dimensions of quality of
care; patient experience, effectiveness of the treatment,
and patient safety. Parties agreed to only adapt the indica-
tors in case there was a need to. However, the validity and
reliability of the initial set of indicators was questioned as
they were perceived to be too aggregated. Therefore, the
set of performance indicators was revised several times
between 2006 and 2014. Some indicators were dropped or
redeﬁned over the years, making it difﬁcult or impossible
to compare data across years [20,25].
Initially, mental health organizations were free to
choose which instrument they used to measure each
of the quality dimensions. In 2010 the Consumer Qual-
ity index (CQ-index) became the obligatory instrument
to measure patient experiences. Although the index was
perceived as a reliable tool for basic, outpatient, mental
health services, low response rates led to questions con-
cerning generalizability of the data [25]. Furthermore, it
was perceived as a less reliable tool for more complicated
mental health patients [25]. In terms of treatment effec-
tiveness, the involved stakeholders agreed that by 2010
Routine Outcome Monitoring (ROM)-measures should be
available for 20% of all DTCs billed by integrated mental
health providers. However, that goal was not met  [25].
As of 2012 providers were obligated to measure treat-
ment effectiveness based on ROM instruments. Although
the percentage of DTCs for which ROM measurements were
available has increased over the years, the goal of having
ROM-measures for 50% of all DTCs by 2014 was not met
either [20]. Furthermore, providers use at least six differ-
ent, not equally sensitive, types of ROM-instruments [26],
complicating comparison across providers [20]. Lastly, the
set of performance indicators used in mental health has 120 (2016) 345–349
lacked case-mix correction [25]. Although in 2015 initial
attempts at case-mix correction were implemented, the
performance indicator measures of previous years have
been described as incomparable across organizations [20].
While the role of quality in the purchasing of child and
youth mental health services by municipalities remains
unclear, contracts between mental health providers and
health insurers regarding adult mental health care pre-
dominantly focus on increasing the transparency of quality.
That is, supplying performance measurements and wait-
ing times are examples of criteria insurers use to offer
providers higher prices or higher price ceilings. Purchasers
seem insensitive to actual quality differences. With the
exception of one insurer, which uses its own quality mea-
surements, the Dutch health authority has no knowledge of
health insurers selectively contracting providers based on
measured quality differences [20]. Providers offering high
quality care are thus not ‘rewarded’ with higher prices for
their services, making price the dominant differentiating
factor.
5. Conclusion
Mental health care is one of the largest expenditure
areas of the basic insurance package in the Netherlands
[16]. Since 2008 the sector has undergone several reforms
in order to make it more competitive and hence more
ﬁnancially sustainable. However, it remains unclear to
what extent the current competitive elements in men-
tal health stimulate value-creating competition [27]. The
introduction of pro-competitive reforms has entrusted the
transition towards high quality care at affordable costs
to a market-led negotiation process between a mixture
of decentralized private (i.e. insurance companies and
providers) and public (i.e. municipalities) actors. While
these actors display rational behavior given their position
and role within the system, overall mental health spending
has increased rather than decreased [11,16] while qual-
ity of care remains ill-deﬁned, incomparable, and in some
cases unmeasured [20,25]. Although vigorous attempts
are made to adequately deﬁne and measure it, quality
still plays a limited role in contracting mental health
providers and insurers and municipalities predominantly
scrutinize providers based on price. Although the Dutch
health authority favors high purchasing power (i.e. high
power of municipalities and insurers) as long as it results
in lower premiums for the patients [19], over-scrutinizing
price without being sensitive to quality aspects leaves
Dutch mental health stuck between a well-functioning
competitive sector and it’s former budgeting system.
To abide by increasing cost constraints and the rapidly
and constantly changing external environment, mental
health providers will have to quickly modify their internal
routines, cost structures, strategies, and customer bases.
Because outpatient services are increasingly offered in pri-
mary care settings for example, integrated mental health
providers might lose an important share of their revenues,
pressuring them to undergo rapid internal change to main-
tain proﬁtability in a changing environment. That is, their
business model and the way they create value need to
be quickly revisited. However, the healthcare sector is
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ighly professionalized and notoriously slow in adopting
echnological and organizational innovations [28]. Faced
ith rapid and daunting price reductions providers may
herefore opt for quick-ﬁx solutions, such as selling prop-
rty or downsizing personnel. While such initiatives could
nable them to offer their services at lower costs and
ecure contracts with insurance companies and munici-
alities in the short-run, they potentially hamper quality
f care and sustainability of the sector in the long-run.
he difﬁculties in deﬁning and measuring the quality of
ental health services undermine the assumptions of well-
unctioning markets. Introducing competitive elements in
ental health care could therefore have unintended or
dverse effects.
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